What are your general feelings?

I tend to be pessimistic, but I assume you’re asking about the final election results.

Great instinct.

By nature, I tend to expect the worst — that’s how it was with the European Parliament elections too. But now I actually feel we’re going to win.

There are five possible scenarios for the morning of April 13. A clear or two-thirds victory for Tisza, a clear or two-thirds victory for Fidesz, and it’s also possible that while Tisza gets the most votes, Fidesz and Mi Hazánk will secure a majority in parliament.

Several of these scenarios are out of the question.

Which one is most likely?

Across the country, we see that the Tisza is not just rising but has already overflowed the banks, and the polls show the same.

Right now, we’re hovering somewhere around the two-thirds threshold. Much depends on whether we can get the more than 3 million people we need for a two-thirds majority to go out and vote on election day.

We are the strongest and most organized community, with more than 50,000 volunteers. Fidesz has no volunteers, only paid employees. Everything indicates that voter turnout in Tisza is much higher, nearly 100 percent. Over the next ten days, we must focus on ensuring they actually go out to vote, while also reaching out to new people.

So the goal is a two-thirds majority.

I have said many times why a two-thirds majority is necessary.

The country has been living under a permanent two-thirds majority for 16 years; we see all the disadvantages of this, even though Viktor Orbán also sought a two-thirds mandate in 2010 to put the country in order. What guarantee is there that Tisza won’t slip the way Fidesz had?

We don’t need a two-thirds majority to create a “Fidesz 2.”

We don’t want unlimited power, but rather to be able to rebuild the system of checks and balances, to enact a new electoral law, and to enshrine in the Fundamental Law that the prime minister’s term of office is limited to two terms, so that we can rid ourselves more quickly of the Fidesz puppets who are keeping this corrupt and inhumane system in power. The situation is completely different now than it was in 2010. On the one hand, we make no secret of what we want; on the other hand, the Tisza community is a very heterogeneous one. We truly believe that there is no right or left, only Hungarians, and our supporters, voters, and candidates come from the most diverse backgrounds. The Tisza Islands, which form the foundation of our political community, also serve as a guarantee. And we have no propaganda, nor do we have any oligarchs — and we never will.

When Fidesz won a two-thirds majority in 2010, the Simicska empire was already standing behind it. We carry no secrets, like Fidesz did in 2010, because we stated our commitments in advance. For example, that we would limit the number of terms for the prime minister in the constitution. This is how a party can offer guarantees; it is not possible to include political guarantees in a notarial deed. We will have two very difficult jobs to fill after April. One is the position of Tisza’s faction leader, and the other is the leadership post at the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office.

Do you already have candidates?

You’re not asking that seriously, are you?

Yes, I am.

Even if we did, I couldn’t tell you. What is certain, however, is that coordinating the Tisza faction and making decisions there will be a huge challenge. That’s because we first have to secure a majority there, not in parliament. So democracy will function in a way where different interests and different worldviews compete with one another. The Tisza faction will include a wide variety of people.

Isn’t that a political risk?

We’re not coming from a dorm room 38 years ago. There are people we met just six months ago; ideologically, these people come from completely different sides of the world. What binds them together is that they love their country. If anyone looks at how I and the Tisza community operate, and at our candidates, they can see that we are risking everything, we are not working day and nigh, I go weeks without seeing my sons, and we push ourselves beyond the limits of our physical endurance and stamina, and all of this is not to throw it all away just because we disagree on a few things. We’re doing this because we see what’s happened in the country, we see the state of the Hungarian countryside, and we know that things could be done much, much better than Fidesz is handling them.

Will it be possible to vote against the Tisza faction? Or will there be iron discipline and sanctions?

Yes, it will be possible to vote against. Obviously, there are very important issues, such as the budget or an amendment to the constitution, where we serve a higher purpose. We made it clear to every candidate during the selection process that we would have our internal debates, but if there is a majority within the faction, then it is fundamentally expected that we will all represent that position together. Of course, if in some cases a matter of conscience, a moral issue, or a social issue comes up on the agenda where someone has a well-founded dissenting opinion, then they may vote against it, but they must notify the faction leadership in advance so that we can prepare accordingly.

There was a recent incident in Harta where your candidate, Zsolt Judák, speaking next to you about Viktor Orbán, made a strange rape-joke.

I immediately made it clear that this was unacceptable. The candidate apologized right away.

Were there any other consequences? From now on, do you ask in advance what the candidate wants to talk about and how they’re preparing?

The incident didn’t have such far-reaching consequences. This also shows that we don’t have black-belt liars like Fidesz does, but rather there are slip-ups like this, which are of course regrettable, but they pale in comparison to the fact that they took our country hostage and launched an attack against free Hungary using secret service tools. To me, this bad joke was a blunder, not a lack of discipline, but rather political naivety.

Would you consider a simple victory a failure compared to a two-thirds majority?

If the Hungarian nation empowers the political community it leads to govern and votes it its confidence, one cannot in any way experience that as a failure. Not even if it has a majority of just a single seat. Of course, we are working to make governing easier, so that these structures built by Orbán’s people can be dismantled. We want to turn the page; we do not want to destroy. When it comes to the budget, the usual approach is to add one percent, then take one percent away the following year, trim a little here and there, and carry on as before. We want to put an end to this. We want to put new cards on the table, and we ask for the people’s authorization to do so. It is possible to govern with a single-mandate majority, and that has to be done. It is possible to govern well that way, and as we have seen, it is possible to govern very poorly even with a two-thirds majority. We are preparing for every scenario, but over the next week or so, we will be working to secure that two-thirds majority. Take parliamentary immunity, for example. So that the justice system can do its job, and if — God forbid — suspicion arises that someone has abused their power and violated the law, for example, by trying to destroy the largest opposition party with the secret services, or by squandering national assets, then the investigative authorities and the courts must be able to take action. There are many Fidesz representatives who are running now specifically to gain parliamentary immunity, because they know that otherwise even cases from ten years ago could be reopened.

Let’s assume they get the two-thirds majority. Then, for example, with the current president…

Excuse me, but I do not consider Tamás Sulyok to be the President of the Republic. This man did not speak out when thousands of children’s lives were ruined, he did not speak out during the systematic plundering of national assets, during the looting of the Hungarian National Bank, he did not speak out when it became clear that the Hungarian foreign minister was not representing Hungarian and European interests, he did not speak out when it became clear that, using communist methods reminiscent of the 1950s, the ruling party was using the secret services to destroy the largest opposition party, Tisza, which was preparing to govern, and he does not speak out when those in power organize a coup against a free Hungary day after day.

In my eyes, this man is not a president of the republic.

One of the president’s primary duties is to foster national unity and to safeguard the functioning of the democratic state. Tamás Sulyok does none of this.

So?

He has to go.

And what if he doesn’t leave on his own? Can a situation be created that would force him to leave? Can he be persuaded to do so somehow?

We’ll ask him to step down.

How? In public? Behind the scenes?

I don’t know if he’ll be willing to meet with me after the election victory, if he hasn’t been willing to do so until now. I continue to believe in transparency, and I won’t be sending messages behind closed doors.

So when he invites you to the Sándor Palace for the first time, will you tell him, “Mr. Sulyok, you should step down”?

Let’s wait for the election results. But if two-thirds of Hungarians decide that this inhumane mafia system must go, then yes, I will respectfully ask the president to step down. I still believe that these puppets will understand the voice of the people, and since the voice of the people is the voice of God, I don’t think they’ll want to stay. Viktor Orbán assumes that the NER is incredibly solid. But this system isn’t as stable as it seems. If we pull out a brick or two from the bottom, the whole thing will collapse like a house of cards.

I hear people inside saying that they’ll sabotage the Tisza government’s operations and make a quick comeback after a defeat. But that’s not how it works. Some will jump ship, turn on each other, and the whole thing will collapse.

Do you already have a candidate for the presidency?

I don’t have a candidate, nor is it up to me to nominate one; I’ve said this many times. We’re discussing several positions in this regard, and we’re thinking in terms of a consensus nomination, especially for the presidency. We need to move beyond the practice of the last 15–20 years of installing party loyalists in that position. After all, that makes no sense, because then there’s really no need for a president. Should we continue to pay for the unoccupied Olympic rooms, Sulyok’s trips, and his frivolities out of public funds? It is outrageous to see the expenses of the Sándor Palace, while Sulyok is unfit to embody the nation’s unity or serve as the country’s living conscience.

Don’t you want direct presidential elections?

Direct presidential elections are worth considering, but this is a long-term issue; a lot would have to change for that to happen. Experts say that direct presidential elections only make sense if the president has greater powers. Of course, being directly elected gives a president a certain legitimacy, but I think this would only make sense if we amended the Fundamental Law to grant the president even greater powers so that he or she could truly exercise a real check on the executive branch.

In the early 2010s, Fidesz used creative power tactics to remove András Baka from the head of the Supreme Court — after it was renamed the Curia — though the government later lost an EU lawsuit over this matter. Is the Tisza Party considering such a direction as well? So if certain leaders do not step down, either voluntarily or upon request, would you, for example, abolish the office they lead?

There are different positions, and we are considering different solutions. However, rebuilding the rule of law cannot be achieved through illegal, unlawful, or unconstitutional measures, nor is it a forward-looking approach, as it would lead to constitutional chaos.

What kind of solutions would these be?

Let me not lay all our cards on the table just yet. Anyone who knows even a little about constitutions and understands the political logic of what a landslide election victory means, I think, knows what kind of solutions we might pursue. But I would fundamentally expect — even as a private citizen — that when Tisza wins a landslide victory, and after we’ve declared that we want a change of system, then those individuals sitting in these positions will accept this as well. We don’t want to remove these people just to put the same kind of people in their place. There is the parity solution, as in the past — for example, the way parties, even those outside parliament, could nominate candidates to head the Media Authority — but there will also be positions where we can nominate candidates through consultation, such as the President of the Constitutional Court or the constitutional judges. I believe that the rule of law can be rebuilt, even if generations are growing up in this country who, unfortunately, have never seen it.

Will Fidesz acknowledge a potential victory for Tisza?

It will have no choice.

Are you sure of that?

I am certain, because “though the galley is on top and the flood of the water below, the water is the master!” (A quote from an 19th century poem — the editor.) I don’t think it’s possible in an EU member state, in the heart of Europe, for a government not to recognize an election result — especially given that Fidesz constantly steals, cheats, and lies, and controls the Ministry of the Interior, the election commission, the IT system, and even organizations across the border. Given all this, if he loses, it would look strange if he didn’t accept the result. Still, what would Orbán cite as a reason if he didn’t accept it?

Ukrainian spies, German spies, hackers, an international conspiracy — anything.

Everyone is already laughing at Fidesz on this issue, even their own people — it’s worth checking out their Facebook posts. Now is the turning point; the time has come for this shift in society. When the signature-gathering took place in February, people realized — even in the smallest towns — just how many of us there are. Hundreds stood in line, while there was no one at the Fidesz booths. Then the campaign began, and on March 15, people were once again confronted with the fact that there were hundreds of thousands of people at the National March — perhaps even half a million — while at the Peace March there were a third of that number or even fewer. Since then, Orbán has embarked on this nationwide Temu-ordered tour, and he can barely scrape together a third as many people by busing them in as we can. Everyone saw the thugs in black, and they saw the prime minister lose control in Győr.

What I see on this tour is that state employees, government officials, government office workers, and police officers are coming out — all people who previously didn’t dare to do this and didn’t act this way. This shows that the oppressive system is over.
I have nothing but bad things to say about Fidesz, but I wouldn’t imagine them risking the state order after the election, or social peace, and wanting, say, a civil war. It wouldn’t be good for them either; they wouldn’t dare do it, because the people have power.
It is especially unstoppable when it senses its own power, and we are at that stage now; this will only intensify until election day. The Hungarian countryside has risen up against Orbán and his cronies; the greatest disappointment and outrage are precisely in those areas where they were once the strongest. This is because they have built a system of predatory feudalism. I would warn Fidesz against any madness, and not because I want to protect them, but because I want to protect our country. If they were unable to govern decently, and if Viktor Orbán does not want to go down in history books in the blackest of letters, then I advise him to at least accept defeat with dignity and hand over the reins of government when the time comes.

But just during the last weeks, something happened that we never thought could happen: the appearance and exposure of Captain Bence Szabó, and along with him, the intelligence operation against the Tisza Party, which has not been refuted since. If you think about this, do you still maintain this position?

Fidesz is constantly crossing the line; that is a fact. But this “Orbángate” has consequences — and even results. It is clear that law enforcement officers—the vast majority of whom are honest patriots — will not tolerate Orbán and his cronies staging a coup against the republic or the Hungarian people. They did not swear an oath to Viktor Orbán, but to the Fundamental Law and to serving the Hungarian people. Until then, of course, Orbán and his cronies will do everything they can: they will steal, cheat, lie, and spend billions on election fraud; already there is bribery, threats, and scheming. We saw in the film The Price of a Vote how this works. I cannot imagine that when the final results are in on the evening of April 12 or the early morning of the 13th—and they are such that even the counting of overseas votes cannot change them—Orbán would refuse to hand over power or fail to acknowledge the election results.

In light of this, do you think Orbán will call you on election night to congratulate you?

That won’t happen. I’m certain of that.

If he did, what would you say to him?

That we understand the Hungarian people’s decision, and we will strive to do better than they did — to govern our country not over the heads of the people, not against the people. I would also tell him that, of course, we won’t be perfect, but we will work for our country’s independence and development. And I would thank him for the congratulations. But I’ll say it again: this won’t happen; Orbán certainly won’t call me. This also shows why they’re failing. Because humanity has been stripped from them, respect has been stripped from them, and their connection to reality has been stripped from them.

And would you call him if you needed to congratulate him?

Let’s be clear: Tisza will not suffer a defeat, but if Fidesz were to win, I would call the prime minister.

What would you say to him?

That we know under what circumstances and amid what irregularities and fraud they won, and despite all that, he should try to do much better than before, and truly work in the people’s interest going forward. I would say something like that, but I’m not preparing for this; I just want to convey the attitude that this is why Tisza will win, and this is why more and more Fidesz voters are coming to us, this is why our numbers are growing day by day, because we represent the humane and peaceful face of Hungary. Here, it is not the Hungarian people standing against the Hungarian people, and I am certain that the day after the election, there will be many more cheerful and smiling people on the streets, even among Fidesz voters. I will speak about this as well in my speech on election night.

So you’ve already written that.

No, I’m just saying that it’s always up to the winner, the one in power, to make gestures in the interest of national unity.
Isn’t taking to the streets an option?

Come on!

Even if they get more votes, they’ll still have fewer seats? Could you accept that?
There are legal remedies. If we can prove fraud, we’ll go to court. Obviously, we won’t accept it if they rig the election; we’re not fools. We can’t accept blatant election fraud.

Let’s turn to Ukraine for a moment; after all, that’s the main theme of the campaign on the other side. Do you think a change of government in Hungary would, in and of itself, resolve relations between the two countries?

As for Ukraine, I can say the same thing as I would about every single neighboring country. We strive for good neighborly relations, whether it’s with Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, Croatia, or even Austria. But there are issues that need to be resolved. With the Slovaks, this obviously involves the issue of the Beneš Decrees and the repeal of legislation that threatens imprisonment. In Transcarpathia, Ukraine, the issues are language rights, cultural rights, and the situation of the Hungarian minority in general. Once we have discussed these, we can move forward.

This won’t happen overnight. However, the assets confiscated from the Ukrainian money transporter could be returned quickly, if you believe they were seized unlawfully. Would you return them?

That’s a ridiculous question. All we know about this matter is the propaganda and the false claims of the government. We’ll look into everything once we get there.

And if it turns out that the Hungarian authorities are holding that money without authority?

I don’t want to comment on a topic about which we don’t know the facts.

If Zelensky invites you to Kyiv, would you go to discuss these matters?

I know my first three destinations. The first is Warsaw, the second is Vienna, and the third is Brussels. The fourth, by the way, might just be Transcarpathia, where the outgoing prime minister hasn’t been since 2015 and hasn’t met with the Hungarians living there.

From there, it’s not far to Kyiv.

I’m not talking about Kyiv, but about Transcarpathia.

The two are one country.

I visited Transcarpathia two years ago, and I was also in Kyiv at the bombed-out children’s hospital. The people of Transcarpathia deserve to finally have a Hungarian prime minister bring them a message from the motherland and offer his help on the ground.
After that, we’ll see how things turn out—whether the Ukrainian president is still called Zelenskyy or not, what the status of the peace agreement is, and so on. We also can’t know what the international situation will be like in two months.

Speaking of Zelenskyy: what do you think of him? Hero, puppet, adventurer, realist?

He’s the president of Ukraine.

And if the President of Ukraine asked you, would you turn on the shut-off gas valve? Yes or no?

There are no questions that can be answered with just a yes or a no. Not for me, anyway. We don’t even know what’s currently shut off.

We are constantly shutting off the gas flow from Hungary to Ukraine.

I’ll say it again: I don’t want to get involved in these kinds of communication games. Fidesz plays these games with imaginary enemies. In energy policy and neighborhood policy alike, we will represent Hungarian interests. I don’t believe in blackmail, nor do I believe that Ukraine can simply choose not to operate the Friendship Pipeline if it so desires. But I do believe that conflicts can be resolved, and I believe that every neighboring country has a stake in this—including us—so that we can live side by side in peace. We will proceed this way if only for the sake of the Hungarian minorities, our Hungarian brothers and sisters; this does not depend on gas valves. We will speak honestly with our international partners, but also with the Hungarian people; we will talk about what really matters. What we are seeing now from Orbán and his people is a power factory, a show-and-tell, which has nothing to do with real politics. I envision politics completely differently, and this will be evident everywhere. By the way, you’re asking about something that, in the case of a Tisza government, won’t even be relevant anymore.

Will Orbán give up his EU veto?

We will not give up anything that represents Hungarian interests. We will not veto just for the sake of vetoing, but because we represent Hungarian national interests in Strasbourg, Brussels, Moscow, or Washington.

We make every decision in light of this. If the national interest requires the Hungarian prime minister to veto, then he will veto. I know very well how Brussels works; I worked there as a diplomat, and I know how difficult it is to reach compromises, but even as a diplomat I never gave up on the national interest, and as prime minister I will never give it up either. I will find a way for Brussels to accept this so that we can bring home the subsidies that Hungarians are entitled to. The European Union is a community of 27 member states where one cannot constantly veto, because then no decisions can be made. You have to sit at the table, not go out for coffee and ask an anti-Hungarian Slovak politician to represent Hungary in the European Council. You have to be there, take on these struggles, and find compromises. That is what I believe in.

And what kind of relationship would a potential Tisza government seek with Russia?

A pragmatic relationship based on mutual respect. This includes them not interfering in Hungarian domestic politics.
What kind of prime minister do you see yourself as? Do you ever think about what kind of head of government you would like to be?

The most important thing for me and our political community is that this country develops, that it becomes a sovereign, free, independent, European country. I’ve been traveling the country for two years; we’ll be at six locations today alone, so I’m actually losing my voice. I’ve shaken hands with countless people, looked them in the eye, been hugged, and listened to their moving, harrowing stories. Sometimes it was a 100-year-old man who did this, and sometimes a five-year-old girl. I will never forget these moments. When I take the oath, all of this will come to mind. I don’t agree with József Antall on everything, but I very much agree with his statement that I want to serve my country. To serve as long as it benefits the nation. To do so as long as I can.

I will step aside the moment someone else can do this better. It is a wonderful thing to be Hungarian, and leading Hungary can be uplifting, though it is also a tremendous responsibility. I see these expectations, this faith, this hope in the Hungarian countryside, even in the smallest villages, and we must live up to them. After all, if expectations are high—as they were after the change of regime or EU accession—then people can easily become disappointed afterward. I would not want such disappointment to be associated with us. That is why I say that if anyone embezzles public funds in the Tisza region, they will have me to deal with, because I will not let anyone destroy this hope, the work, and the faith of all these people. We won’t be perfect; I’m human too, and I’m sure I’ve made plenty of mistakes already, and I’ll make more in the future. So if that’s what your question was getting at, I’ll admit my mistakes, acknowledge them, and try to learn from them. I want to be a human prime minister.
People say that Péter Magyar is a populist. Perhaps there is such a thing as a populist in the positive sense, when you truly want to be accountable to the people, when you want to stay connected with them. I want to be the kind of prime minister that I am: true to myself, honest. I’d also like to see the nation united not just during the Olympic Games or when the national soccer team wins, when we sing the Hungarian national anthem. I want to unite the country. I want to celebrate the 70th anniversary of October 23 in a country where we are a much more united nation that sees the humanity in one another, both within and beyond our borders.

Would you make any gestures toward Fidesz? We know that the opening of the Budapest-Belgrade high-speed rail line will be delayed; it may be handed over under the Tisza government. If that happens, will you invite János Lázár to the opening ceremony?

I don’t think Hungarian politics needs such insincere gestures.

Then what kind of gestures are needed?

There is no need to make gestures toward the mafia. The power that exists today is an organized criminal group, in all its political and economic branches. Why should we make gestures?

Fidesz will represent millions of people in parliament, even if it happens to be in the opposition.

I don’t want to restrict anyone’s political rights, but I don’t want to make gestures toward a mafia.

Can you imagine establishing a relationship with Fidesz—perhaps even with the party’s current leader—that is characteristic of a consolidated parliamentary democracy? That you might coordinate on national issues and various laws when necessary?

Let’s split this into two parts. On the one hand, I can say that we will establish the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office. When I think of János Lázár and many other Fidesz politicians, this is what comes to mind. There are exceptions, of course.

Is Gergely Gulyás an exception?

Gergely Gulyás probably didn’t get rich; he didn’t steal that much money, but those around him did. When I think of the MCC, when I think of Libri, when I think of the Mol shares, when I think of those swarming around him, then unfortunately I can no longer say that Gergely Gulyás did not participate in these decisions, because he approved the secret service surveillance, he knew about the looting of the Hungarian National Bank, and the ruin of the country.

I have no quarrel with Gergely Gulyás. He is my child’s godfather, but he says unacceptable things about me that I don’t think are necessary; I never say such things about him, and I never comment on his personal life. He may have once been a more human-faced Fidesz member, as Tibor Navracsics also tried to portray him, but today no one among Fidesz politicians can claim that they do not represent a mafia.

But in addition to the above, it is also important that there are national issues on which we seek consensus, and national minimums that we will respect. I will not curtail anyone’s political rights. We will not exclude them from the public media, and we will not send the secret services after them. In fact, the more Fidesz members appear in the new public media—which operates fairly and impartially—the better for us: let them just make fools of themselves, because they’re used to avoiding debate and real issues.

I see, but it seems to me that you still can’t imagine this kind of dialogue.

I will defend the rights of the opposition myself. I won’t be making gestures toward Fidesz, but I will respect those of my fellow citizens who vote for Fidesz: I would make a gesture toward them. If someone is an elected representative and isn’t under indictment, hasn’t been convicted, and isn’t in custody, then they have political rights.

Can you imagine sitting down with Orbán to discuss political issues?

I can imagine that, and we are preparing for the Tisza Party’s prime minister—or even its parliamentary leader—to consult with other politicians or the other opposition parties on key national issues before decisions are made.

So such consultations are not out of the question.

Of course not. We must consult. But that doesn’t mean we’ll be good friends, nor does it mean we’ll be smiling at each other. We must consult because they will represent a significant number of people. I’ll say it again: we will not be Fidesz 2. Accountability and justice will be served. But we will respect the representatives elected by the Hungarian people in a political sense. Even with a two-thirds majority. There are quite a few people who say that Fidesz should be banned. I don’t believe in that; those are communist methods. Besides, Fidesz will fall apart on its own.

Is there a chance that, given the state of the budget, the Tisza government might not maintain or extend the tax exemptions that the government has so far introduced on a partial basis—such as those for mothers—starting next year?

Not at all. Once the handover is complete, we’ll see what state the budget is in, what our international commitments are, what secret agreements and government decisions exist, and with what clauses our country has been sold off. Then we’ll make our decisions, and we’ll explain in detail what state Hungary is in, whether it’s healthcare, the economy, or anything else. We won’t look back and point fingers; we won’t spend twenty years blaming Gyurcsány or Orbán. We’ll keep what’s good. If they don’t steal three to five trillion forints from the budget every year, if EU funds are available, if the economy picks up, if there’s a predictable economic policy and a stable budget, then we’ll be able to finance these expenditures. We will introduce a wealth tax on billionaires, which will allow us to fulfill the Tisza Party’s commitments: we will lower taxes and VAT, raise pensions, expand family benefits, and provide back-to-school assistance to 700,000 children in need. Nothing is impossible, only helplessness; I have seen the Hungarian economy in difficult situations before, and an era of recovery always follows. That is what is coming now.

We won’t be perfect, but we have a program that everyone can understand and hold us accountable for; we’ll report every six months on our progress in implementing it. I believe that with this program, we can lift Hungary up and set it on a path of development. I believe that our country can be a functioning and humane nation where everyone will live better, where young Hungarians currently living abroad will return in droves, and where the long-awaited children will be born.

We have to go, but three quick questions to finish up. Is there a difference between Ádám Matolcsy, István Tiborcz, and Lőrinc Mészáros?

They will all be top-priority clients of the National Asset Recovery and Protection Office.

Will there be a deal with Fidesz? Are small fish being sacrificed so the big fish can get away with it?

No.

Until 2010, one could say that Hungary was a liberal democracy that functioned more or less well; Viktor Orbán has described the period since then as an illiberal democracy. Starting in 2026, if Tisza forms a government, what kind of democracy will Hungary have?

It will be a democracy.

Without any adjectives?

Yes. I don’t like terms like “people’s democracy,” nor do I like “illiberal democracy.” These are more like pejoratives. There isn’t this kind or that kind of democracy; there is only one kind, even if it’s hard to grasp. I don’t want any adjectives, and we won’t be attaching any to it ourselves.

Democracy is a beautiful word, isn’t it?

The post Péter Magyar: Matolcsy, Mészáros, and Tiborcz will be the first priority clients of the National Asset Recovery Office first appeared on 24.hu.

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